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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                        
 
 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge. 
 
     Plaintiff Richard Homar was suspended without pay from his 
position as a police officer at East Stroudsburg University after 
his arrest on drug-related charges.  The criminal charges against 
Homar were eventually dismissed, but Homar was nonetheless 
subsequently demoted to the position of groundskeeper.  Homar filed 
suit in federal district court seeking reinstatement, backpay and 
damages for violations of his due process rights.  The district 
court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants.  Plaintiff 
appeals. 
     Although we conclude that these circumstances warranted and 
justified an immediate suspension of employment without a hearing, 
the added suspension of pay necessitated a hearing.  Furthermore, 
the subsequent restoration of that pay cannot serve to cure the due 
process violation.  It may serve to reduce the damages to which the 
employee may be entitled, but the deprivation must be viewed at the 
time of its occurrence, not as belatedly corrected by later action; 
otherwise employers could violate the due process rights of their 
employees and simply cure those violations through the means of 
retroactive pay. 
     We also hold that once suspended, an employee is entitled to 
a hearing before any further action is taken to demote, terminate, 
or extend his suspension.  At such a hearing, the employee is 
entitled to know the evidence against him and be afforded the 
opportunity for a meaningful response.  We conclude that there is 
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether such a hearing was 
afforded here, and we thus reverse the order of summary judgment. 
  
                                I. 
     Plaintiff Richard Homar was employed as a police officer at 
East Stroudsburg University ("ESU").  On August 26, 1992, Homar was 
arrested when a drug raid took place at the home of his friend, 
James Crompton, whom he was visiting.  That same day, the 
Pennsylvania State Police filed a criminal complaint against Homar 
charging him with possession of marijuana, possession with intent 
to deliver and criminal conspiracy.   
     The state police called David Marazas, ESU's police chief and 
Homar's supervisor, to inform him of Homar's arrest and the charges 
against him.  Marazas then informed Gerald Levanowitz, ESU's 
Director of Human Resources, to whom ESU President James Gilbert 
had delegated authority to discipline and suspend ESU employees.  
Levanowitz decided immediately to suspend Homar without pay.  No 
pre-suspension hearing was held.   
     On August 27, Homar received a letter from Levanowitz advising 
him that he was suspended without pay pending further investigation 
and disposition of the criminal charges.  The letter advised Homar 
that any administrative action taken by the University against him 
"[did] not have to coincide with the disposition of those charges 
through the legal process."  Appendix ("App.") at 197.   
     District Justice Charles P. Eyer dismissed all criminal 
charges against Homar on September 1, 1992.  Levanowitz still 
refused to lift Homar's suspension. 
     On September 11, 1992, Levanowitz, along with two ESU police 
sergeants who were assigned to conduct an investigation on Homar, 
met with two state troopers and a Corporal to discuss Homar's 
situation.  App. at 143.  One of the troopers was the state trooper 
who signed the criminal complaint against Homar.  At this meeting, 
Levanowitz was provided with a copy of a page from the Pennsylvania 
State Police investigative file regarding Homar, called the 
"Supplemental Report."  This report includes statements attributed 
to Homar that he allegedly made to the Pennsylvania State Police 
when he was interviewed shortly after his arrest.  According to the 
Supplemental Report, Homar admitted his knowledge of drug dealing 
by Crompton and another man named Habhab, and Homar further 
admitted that he had received marijuana from Habhab for his own use 
while he was employed as an ESU police officer.  Homar contests 
that he ever made these statements. 
     On September 15, 1992, Levanowitz called Homar and arranged 
for a meeting three days later.  Levanowitz explained that this 
meeting would be an "administrative hearing," and that accordingly 
Homar had a right to have his union representative present but that 
he did not have a right to legal counsel.   
     Homar attended this meeting on September 18, 1992, along with 
his union representative.  Besides Levanowitz, Marazas was also 
present, as well as Levanowitz's secretary.  At the start of the 
meeting, Homar's union representative requested that Homar's 
attorney be present.  Levanowitz responded that if Homar so chose, 
they would have to postpone the meeting until a later time.  Homar 
opted to proceed with the meeting unrepresented.  According to the 
notes taken by Levanowitz's secretary, Levanowitz made the 
following statement to Homar: 
     The purpose of this meeting today is to give you an 
     opportunity to provide any information on your own behalf 
     that would assist us in making a determination concerning 
     the action that would end your suspension and any 
     information that would be of help to you in presenting 
     your case. 
App. at 205. 
     Levanowitz maintained at a deposition held later that he had 
told Homar that "the State Police had given [him] some evidence 
very serious in nature," App. at 164, and that he offered Homar the 
opportunity to present his side of the story.  Levanowitz never 
informed Homar that he had received the Supplemental Report from 
the state police containing his alleged confession.   
     On September 23, 1992, Levanowitz wrote a letter to Homar 
advising him that he was being demoted from the position of police 
officer to the position of groundskeeper.  The text of the letter 
reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
          This is to inform you that you are to be demoted 
     from your position as a Police Officer I in the Campus 
     Police Department to the position of Groundskeeper. . . 
     . The action is effective retroactive to August 26, 1992, 
     and you are to be given back pay to that date at the rate 
     of pay for a Groundskeeper.  You are to report to work at 
     7:00 A.M. on September 24, 1992 at the Facilities 
     Management Office.  Your new rate of pay as Groundskeeper 
     will be $552.80 bi-weekly. 
 
          This action is being taken as a result of admissions 
     made by yourself to the Pennsylvania State Police on 
     August 26, 1992 that you maintained association with 
     individuals whom you knew were dealing in large 
     quantities of marijuana and you obtained marijuana from 
     one of those individuals for your own use.  Your actions 
     constitute a clear and flagrant violation of Sections 200 
     and 200.2 of the East Stroudsburg University Police 
     Department Manual. 
App. at 208 (footnote added). 
     After this letter was issued, the president of the union 
representing Homar requested that Homar have an opportunity to meet 
with President Gilbert regarding the letter.  The meeting occurred 
on September 24, 1992 at 2:00 p.m.  By this time, Homar had 
received and read a copy of the Supplemental Report.  Gilbert 
provided Homar with an opportunity to respond to the charges and to 
Levanowitz's decision.  Gilbert nonetheless sustained the 
suspension.   
     After failing to obtain relief through his union grievance 
procedure, Homar filed a complaint in the district court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania against Gilbert, Levanowitz and 
Marazas.  His complaint alleges that the procedures by which he was 
suspended and then demoted lacked required due process, that 
defendants' actions deprived him of liberty and property, and that 
his substantive due process rights were also violated.  The 
district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants 
on March 17, 1995.  Homar then appealed to this court. 
 
                               II. 
     The district court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C.  1331 and 1343 and 42 U.S.C.  1983.  This court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal of the district court's final decision 
under 28 U.S.C.  1291. 
     Our review of the district court's order for summary judgment 
is plenary, and we thus apply the same standards that were 
applicable in the district court.  J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A- 
Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1530 (3d Cir., 1990), cert. denied, 
499 U.S. 921 (1991).  Summary judgment is appropriately granted 
when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(c).  If, however, "the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party," 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), summary 
judgment shall not be granted.  Homar, as the nonmoving party, is 
entitled to have all reasonable inferences drawn in his favor.  SeeJ.F. 
Feeser, 909 F.2d at 1531. 
 
                               III. 
     Homar's first claim is that ESU failed to provide him a 
meaningful pre-deprivation hearing prior to his suspension without 
pay and his subsequent demotion from police officer to 
groundskeeper.  
     In Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 
(1985), the United States Supreme Court held that when a public 
employee has a property interest in his or her employment he or she 
is entitled to a meaningful pre-termination hearing.  Such a 
hearing need not be elaborate, but rather "an initial check against 
mistaken decision -- essentially, a determination of whether there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the 
employee are true and support the proposed action."  Id. at 545-46.  
Loudermill specifically requires that prior to termination: 
     [a] tenured public employee is entitled to oral or 
     written notice of the charges against him, an explanation 
     of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present 
     his side of the story. 
Id. at 546.    
     The Supreme Court has made it eminently clear that due process 
entitles a party to such a hearing "before he [or she] is deprived 
of any significant property interest, except for extraordinary 
situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that 
justifies postponing the hearing until after the event."  Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); see also Loudermill, 470 
U.S. at 542;  Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971).  This 
fundamental right to a pre-deprivation hearing is not abridged by 
the availability of extensive post-deprivations remedies.  SeeMorton v. 
Beyer, 822 F.2d 364, 368 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that 
"the availability of extensive post-termination procedures does not 
eliminate the essential requirement of due process that a hearing 
be provided before discharge"); Gniotek v. City of Philadelphia, 
808 F.2d 241, 243 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that "[t]he predeprivation 
hearing need not be elaborate, but it is necessary, even if 
extensive post-deprivation remedies are afforded."), cert. denied, 
481 U.S. 1050 (1987).  
     While we recognize that Homar was not completely terminated 
from his employment with ESU, he was terminated from his position 
as a police officer and received a reduction in his pay.  
Accordingly, we find the requirements of Loudermill to be 
applicable in this instance.  Indeed, there is no dispute among the 
parties that Homar had a property interest in his employment as 
police officer.  Rather, the dispute concerns the degree of due 
process to which Homar was entitled prior to his suspension without 
pay and prior to his demotion from his position as police officer 
to groundskeeper.    
                                A. 
     We will first address Homar's contention that he was entitled 
to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to his suspension 
without pay from his position as an ESU police officer.   
     It is undisputed that Homar was not afforded any kind of 
hearing prior to his suspension without pay immediately following 
his arrest on drug charges.  ESU nonetheless argues that Homar's 
due process rights were not violated because, while Homar's 
interest in remaining in his job is "an important one," ESU had a 
compelling interest in "taking prompt action to maintain public 
confidence in its police force."  Appellee's Brief at 15.  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has explained that  
     [a]n important government interest, accompanied by a 
     substantial assurance that the deprivation is not 
     baseless or unwarranted, may in limited cases demanding 
     prompt action justify postponing the opportunity to be 
     heard until after the initial deprivation. 
FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240 (1988); see also Boddie, 401 U.S. 
at 379 (noting that there can be "extraordinary situations where 
some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies 
postponing the hearing until after the event").   
     The district court agreed with ESU, finding that it was 
permissible for the university to suspend Homar without pay and 
without a hearing.  The court first noted that "[b]oth the timing 
and the nature of requisite process depends upon an 'appropriate 
accommodation of the competing interests involved.'"  Homar v. 
Gilbert, No. CV-93-0853, typescript at 11 (M.D. Pa., March 17, 
1995) (hereinafter "D. Ct. Op.") (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 
565, 579 (1975)).  It then applied the analysis prescribed by Logan 
v. Zimmerman Brush Co., assessing the competing interests involved, 
including "the importance of the private interest, and the length 
and finality of the deprivation, . . . the likelihood of 
governmental error, . . . and the magnitude of the governmental 
interests involved."  Id., typescript at 11 (quoting Logan v. 
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 434 (1982)).  While the district 
court recognized that Homar's "private interest was strong," it 
found that "the deprivation incident to a suspension was only 
temporary and of a relatively brief duration (approximately one 
month)."  Id., typescript at 11.  The district court concluded that 
Homar's interest in avoiding such a "temporary" and "brief" 
deprivation was not as compelling as "the governmental interest in 
preserving public confidence in law enforcement." Id., typescript 
at 12.  The court found its conclusion bolstered by the fact that 
Homar was eventually awarded full pay and benefits for the period 
of suspension, noting that "'[s]uspension with pay does not raise 
due process concerns.'" Id., typescript at 13 (quoting Hicks v. 
City of Watonga, Okl., 942 F.2d 737, 746 n.4 (10th Cir. 1991).  
     We agree with the district court that there was a compelling 
governmental interest which supports ESU's decision to suspend 
Homar immediately and without a hearing pending further 
investigation.  The university has a substantial interest in 
maintaining public confidence in the ESU police force, and Homar's 
arrest on drug charges certainly suffices to ensure that the 
university's concerns were not baseless or unwarranted, as required 
by the Supreme Court.  See Mallen, 486 U.S. at 240. In 
circumstances where public safety is implicated, "[n]ot even an 
informal hearing . . . must precede a deprivation."  Caine v. 
Hardy, 943 F.2d 1406, 1412 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 
503 U.S. 936 (1992).    
     Nonetheless, we find that Homar's due process rights were 
violated because he was suspended without pay.  The Supreme Court's 
decision in Loudermill strongly suggests that suspension without 
pay must be preceded by notice and an opportunity to be heard in 
all instances.  Initially, the Court noted that it had "frequently 
recognized the severity of depriving a person of the means of 
livelihood."  Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543.  Then the Court 
explained that, while it recognized that there were some limited 
instances in which a strong governmental interest might warrant 
immediately removing a person from a position without a hearing, 
"in those situations where the employer perceives a significant 
hazard in keeping the employee on the job, it can avoid the problem 
by suspending with pay."  Id. at 544-45 (emphasis added).    
     Other circuits which have examined this language in Loudermillhave 
disagreed with regard to its precise mandate.  At least one 
court of appeals has read Loudermill to require that an employee be 
provided an opportunity to be heard prior to suspension without 
pay. See Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1512 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that, under Loudermill a suspended firefighter was 
entitled to a hearing prior to suspension because he was not paid 
during his suspension).  The Federal Circuit, by contrast, noted 
that Loudermill's prescription of suspension with pay in situations 
where significant hazards would result from continued employment 
was only dicta:  "We agree that in the instant case, the government 
could have suspended with pay.  Nevertheless, we cannot read 
Loudermill as holding the government must suspend . . . with pay." 
Engdahl v. Dept. of Navy, 900 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  
Other circuits, while not explicitly addressing Loudermill, have on 
occasion allowed suspension without pay to stand even in the 
absence of a pre-deprivation hearing.  See, e.g., Jones v. City of 
Gary, Ind., 57 F.3d 1435, 1436 (7th Cir. 1995); Ambus v. Granite 
Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 1555, 1558, 1562 (10th Cir. 1992), modified 
on rehearing by, 995 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1993) (en banc).   
     This court has not precisely addressed this issue in the past. 
However, our decision in Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 
F.2d 1064 (3d Cir. 1990), may be read to imply that, under 
Loudermill, suspension without a pre-deprivation hearing is only 
constitutional if the suspension is one with pay.  In Bradley, we 
were called upon to decide, among other issues, whether a teacher 
who had been effectively suspended without pay and without a 
hearing for one year prior to being officially terminated, had been 
deprived of his procedural due process rights.  The employer in 
Bradley ultimately provided Bradley full sabbatical pay for the 
year in question.  The district court had relied upon Loudermill to 
conclude that the employer was entitled to suspend Bradley without 
a pre-suspension hearing because he eventually had been provided 
payment for the period of suspension.  Id. at 1077.  In reviewing 
this decision, we first acknowledged that under Loudermill, in 
circumstances where a governmental employer perceives substantial 
hazards in keeping an employee on the job, it may suspend the 
employee with pay until such time that a hearing may be held.  Id.(citing 
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 544-45).  We concluded, however, 
that "Loudermill [did] not govern [that] case because Bradley was 
suspended without pay." Id. We thus implicitly, but necessarily, 
rejected the idea that a government employer could cite to the 
substantial hazards of keeping an employee on the job and thereby 
suspend him without a pre-suspension hearing without pay.  Had we 
determined that Bradley had been suspended with pay, we presumably 
would have found that the Loudermill exception -- essentially the 
Mallen exception -- applied.  Thus, while Bradley does not 
explicitly declare that suspension without pay and without a pre- 
suspension hearing always violates due process, such a holding may 
be inferred from its reasoning.   
     Today we clearly enunciate that a governmental employer may 
not suspend an employee without pay unless that suspension is 
preceded by some kind of pre-suspension hearing, providing the 
employee with notice and an opportunity to be heard.  We think that 
such a holding is not only consistent with, and suggested by, 
Loudermill, but it is also eminently sensible.  It is imperative 
that employers be provided with adequate flexibility to allow them 
to protect the public and respond to emergency situations 
expediently.  Suspension with pay addresses these important 
concerns while simultaneously protecting the fundamental rights of 
an employee to due process prior to being deprived of his or her 
property interest in employment and its accompanying salary. 
Furthermore, this conclusion seems consistent with the Supreme 
Court's holding in Zimmerman Brush that, in determining the timing 
and nature of an appropriate hearing, courts should assess the 
competing interests involved and arrive at an appropriate 
accommodation.  Zimmerman Brush, 455 U.S. at 434.     
     As noted above, the district court treated Homar's suspension 
as a suspension with pay:  
     That Homar was originally suspended without pay does not 
     warrant a finding that he was deprived of property 
     without due process.  At most, he was denied use of his 
     salary for a very brief period of time.  To recognize a 
     cause of action for denial of due process under these 
     circumstances would clearly elevate form over substance. 
 
                        *     *     *      
 
     Since he clearly could be suspended with pay without 
     implicating due process concerns, and within one month 
     after being suspended he was awarded full pay for the 
     period of suspension, any injury resulting from the 
     failure to provide an opportunity to be heard before the 
     suspension was imposed is surely de minimis. 
D. Ct. Op., typescript at 13-14.   
     We fundamentally disagree with the district court's 
conclusion.  First, our decision in Bradley clearly indicates that 
the subsequent awarding of backpay does not remedy a due process 
violation: 
     The right to procedural due process cannot be so 
     ephemeral that it evaporates because an individual 
     suspended without pay happened to obtain paid leave 
     thereafter. . . . That may affect the damages ultimately 
     awarded, but if there was a violation of due process, 
     [the employee] is entitled to have that right vindicated. 
Bradley, 913 F.2d at 1077. 
     Second, Homar's suspension without pay cannot be viewed as deminimis.   
At the time that Homar was suspended, he was told that 
he was "to be suspended without pay, effective immediately on 
8/26/92, from [his] position as a police officer at East 
Stroudsburg University."  App. at 197.  For a period of 
approximately one month, Homar's very livelihood was threatened 
because he received no salary.  As far as Homar knew at the time of 
his suspension, he had no prospects whatsoever of receiving any 
wages for the indefinite duration of his suspension.  It was not 
until he received his letter of demotion on September 24, 1992 -- 
nearly a month after he was suspended -- that he learned he would 
be receiving backpay at the rate of a groundskeeper.  While it is 
true that Homar eventually received backpay at the wage rate he 
earned as a police officer to cover the period of his suspension, 
we note that according to Defendant's Statement of Material Fact 
accompanying their Motion for Summary Judgment, Levanowitz did not 
authorize Homar's backpay at the rate of a police officer until 
February 16, 1993.  Thus, for nearly six months, Homar was deprived 
of a salary that was rightfully his.  Furthermore, there is 
evidence to suggest that ESU only agreed to pay this rate upon 
pressure from Homar's union representative.     
       Accordingly, we find that Homar was entitled to notice and 
at least some kind of hearing prior to being suspended without 
pay.  It is undisputed that Homar received no hearing prior to his 
suspension, and we conclude that the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on this issue. 
  
                                B. 
     Homar further alleges that he was deprived of meaningful pre- 
termination due process in the course of his demotion to the 
position of groundskeeper. 
     As outlined above, Loudermill requires that a public employee 
with a property interest in his or her employment be granted a 
meaningful pre-termination hearing.  Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545- 
46.  We reiterate that it is of paramount importance that this 
hearing take place prior to the deprivation.  As explained above, 
absent compelling government interests justifying postponement of 
a hearing, the hearing must take place before the deprivation, seeBoddie, 
401 U.S. at 379; Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542;  Bell, 402 
U.S. at 542, because "the only meaningful opportunity to invoke the 
discretion of the decisionmaker is likely to be before the 
termination takes effect."  Id.; see also, Board of Regents v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7 (1972).  Indeed, this right to pre- 
deprivation due process is so fundamental that it remains "even if 
extensive post-deprivation remedies are afforded."  Gniotek, 808 
F.2d at 243; see also Morton, 822 F.2d at 368.  
     This pre-deprivation hearing need not be elaborate.  As 
explained by the Supreme Court, "'something less' than a full 
evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative 
action."  Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545 (citations omitted).  
Nonetheless, the hearing must be sufficient to inform the employee 
of the evidence against him or her and to respond to the evidence.  
See Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 v. Tucker, 868 F.2d 74, 
80 (3d Cir. 1989).  "[A] sina [sic] qua non of a meaningful hearing 
is a sufficient explanation of the employer's evidence to permit a 
meaningful response." Id.  
     Under the circumstances presented here, where Homar was 
suspended from his position pending further investigation into his 
activities, it is clear that there was no compelling government 
issue at stake that would require ESU to immediately deprive Homar 
of his employment.  Any concerns about preserving public safety or 
the integrity of the police force were met by Homar's suspension.  
The university thus was afforded the time it would need adequately 
to provide Homar a pre-deprivation hearing.  The question for us to 
answer, then, is whether the university provided him such a 
hearing.   
     The district court concluded that the "administrative hearing" 
which took place on September 18 did not meet the due process 
requirements of a pre-deprivation hearing because it "did not allow 
[Homar] to make a meaningful response to the damaging information 
found in the supplemental report."  D. Ct. Op., typescript at 15.  
We agree. 
     During the September 18 meeting, Levanowitz only told Homar 
that the State Police had given him some "evidence very serious in 
nature."  App. at 164.  While it safely can be presumed that Homar 
knew that ESU's concerns about his employment arose from his arrest 
on drug charges, Homar was not aware of the allegations made 
against him by the troopers that were presented in the Supplemental 
Report, namely that he allegedly confessed to knowing that Crompton 
and Habhab were drug dealers and to receiving marijuana from Habhab 
during his employment as a police officer.  More to the point, 
Homar was completely unaware that Levanowitz had received a copy of 
the Supplemental Report containing these allegations.  Under these 
circumstances it is very clear that Homar's right to a meaningful 
pre-deprivation hearing was denied.  See Tucker, 868 F.2d at 80 
(holding that suspended police officers who were not told anything 
specific about drug use allegations or the evidence regarding the 
allegations were deprived of their due process rights because they 
had no opportunity to explain or rebut evidence).     
     In spite of its conclusion regarding the insufficiency of the 
September 18 "administrative hearing," the district court entered 
summary judgment in favor of defendants because it concluded that 
Homar's September 24, 1995 meeting with President Gilbert, prior to 
which Homar had received and read the Supplemental Report, was a 
meaningful pre-termination hearing.  D. Ct. Op., typescript at 16.  
Given that Homar was afforded an opportunity to review the 
Supplemental Report and offer meaningful responses to the 
allegations, we find that this meeting afforded Homar with 
sufficient procedural due process protections assuming it took 
place prior to his demotion becoming effective.  While true that an 
employee is not entitled to a pre-decision hearing, see Chung v. 
Park, 514 F.2d 382, 387 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 948 
(1975), only if this hearing took place before his demotion tookeffect can 
we conclude that he was afforded meaningful due process. 
      The district court held as a matter of law that Homar's 
dismissal from his position as a police officer took effect only 
after this meeting with President Gilbert.  D. Ct. Op., typescript 
at 16.  The district court found that the meeting, which took place 
at 2 p.m. on September 24, 1992, "occurred before Homar would have 
started his evening shift as police officer should Gilbert have 
decided to reinstate him to that position," id., and thus concluded 
that "Gilbert's decision that Homar could not return to ESU as a 
police officer is properly viewed as the point in time when Homar 
was deprived of his position as an ESU police officer."  Id.    
     We disagree with the district court that the point in time at 
which Homar's demotion became effective is clear.  There is 
substantial evidence in the record to support a conclusion that 
Homar's demotion took effect prior to this meeting.  Homar's 
meeting with Gilbert took place on September 24 at 2:00 p.m.  The 
letter which Levanowitz sent to Homar apprising him that he had 
been demoted to Groundskeeper was dated on September 23, 1992.  In 
that letter, Levanowitz informed Homar that he was "to be demoted 
from [his] position as a Police Officer I in the Campus Police 
Department to the position of Groundskeeper, a position [he] 
formerly held."  App. at 208 (emphasis added).  The letter further 
required that Homar "report to work at 7:00 A.M. on September 24, 
1992," to start his job as groundskeeper, and informed Homar that 
this "action is effective retroactive to August 26, 1992."  App. at 
208 (emphasis added).  Homar testified during a deposition that he 
was already working as a groundskeeper at the time of his September 
24th, 2:00 p.m. meeting with Gilbert.  There is thus evidence 
suggesting that Homar had already been demoted to groundskeeper by 
the time this meeting took place.  If this is true, then Homar was 
deprived of a meaningful pre-deprivation hearing. 
     The district court based its contrary conclusion on two 
grounds.  First, the court determined that "[t]he significance of 
the meeting was that Gilbert held ultimate decision-making 
authority regarding whether Homar would remain employed by ESU as 
a police officer."  D. Ct. Op., typescript at 15.  However, this 
meeting with Gilbert never would have occurred had Homar's union 
representative not sought to arrange for the meeting with Gilbert.  
App. at 225.  This fact seems to suggest that Levanowitz's demotion 
of Homar would have become effective without Gilbert's approval, 
which would render Levanowitz's letter the final demotion.  
Levanowitz's authoritative tone in the letter similarly supports 
this conclusion. 
     The district court also concluded that the meeting with 
Gilbert had taken place prior to Homar's demotion because it 
occurred before 4 p.m., the time at which Homar would normally 
begin his shift as a police officer.  Id. at 16.  We disagree that 
the timing of the demotion is so clear.  We think there is 
certainly an issue of material fact as to whether Homar's demotion 
became effective on August 26, as stated in the letter; at 7:00 
a.m. on September 24, the date he was told to report to work as a 
groundskeeper; or at 4:00 p.m. on September 24, the time at which 
Homar would normally report to work as a police officer.  Unless 
defendants expected Homar to act as both groundskeeper and police 
officer on September 24, the facts appear to support the conclusion 
that Homar's demotion was effective at the latest by 7 a.m. on the 
morning of September 24th, seven hours prior to his meeting with 
Gilbert.  
     We thus conclude that there is a genuine issue of material 
fact regarding the date and time at which Homar's demotion became 
effective, and that the district court's grant of summary judgment 
was therefore inappropriate.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (holding summary judgment is inappropriate 
if there is evidence "such that a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the nonmoving party.").  Accordingly, we reverse the 
district court's entry of summary judgment regarding Homar's 
meaningful pre-deprivation hearing. 
 
                               IV. 
     Homar also contends that there is an issue of material fact as 
to whether his substantive due process rights were violated.  
Relying on this court's precedent in Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City 
of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 692 (3d Cir. 1993) in which we stated 
that "[a] violation of substantive due process rights is proven: . 
. . 'if the government's actions in a particular case were in fact 
motivated by bias, bad faith or improper motive. . . ,'" id.(quoting 
Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 
683 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 984 (1992)), Homar 
points to several facts that he argues demonstrate that his 
suspension and demotion were motivated by bias, bad faith or 
improper motive.   
     The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
defendants on this claim on the ground that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Levanowitz, Gilbert or any 
other ESU official was motivated by bias, bad faith or improper 
motive. 
     While we agree with the district court that the evidence in 
this case does not support a conclusion that Levanowitz or any 
other ESU official was motivated by an improper motive in 
suspending and then demoting Homar, for there is, indeed, "nothing 
improper about conducting an investigation of a law enforcement 
officer who has been arrested, even if the charges are ultimately 
dismissed,"  D. Ct. Op., typescript at 23, we think that there is 
a question of material fact as to whether ESU officials acted in 
bad faith.  Several events leading up to Homar's demotion suggest 
that Levanowitz did not engage in a good faith effort to accord 
Homar appropriate due process protection throughout his ordeal.  
Levanowitz never informed Homar that he had received and read the 
Supplemental Report prior to their September 18 meeting; Levanowitz 
ordered that a poll be taken among police officers regarding 
whether Homar should be allowed to return to the force, which is 
certainly a very strange proceeding outside the realm of 
traditional due process proceedings; and Levanowitz issued the 
September 23 letter of demotion prior to the meeting with President 
Gilbert -- a meeting which occurred only after Homar's union 
representative requested it take place.  Such events might lead a 
reasonable fact-finder to conclude that Homar's demotion was pre- 
determined and to view the entire demotion process as rigged to 
produce this result.  
     Our conclusion that there is a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether ESU officials were motivated by bad faith, however, 
does not lead us to remand this matter simply for a factual 
finding.  A more fundamental legal question must first be 
addressed, namely whether Homar's property interest in his state- 
created job is an interest worthy of protection under substantive 
due process.  DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 
598, 600 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that before addressing the 
sufficiency of the evidence of improper motive, a court addressing 
a substantive due process claim should first consider whether the 
plaintiff possesses a property interest worthy of substantive due 
process protection).  Although Homar has succeeded in making a 
procedural due process claim, under the law of this circuit "not 
all property interests worthy of procedural due process protections 
are protected by the concept of substantive due process."  Reich v. 
Beharry, 883 F.2d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 1989).  In order to state a 
substantive due process claim, "a plaintiff must have been deprived 
of a certain quality of property interest."  DeBlasio, 53 F.3d at 
600.   
     The parties did not address before the district court the 
question of whether a state-created property interest in employment 
is the "certain quality" of property interest worthy of protection 
under the substantive due process clause, nor did the district 
court consider it.  While courts of appeals do have discretion to 
consider and resolve certain issues for the first time on appeal, 
such as where the proper resolution is not in doubt or where 
"'injustice might otherwise result,'"  Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 
106, 121 (1976) (quoting Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 
(1941)); see also Nelson v. County of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1013 
n.3 (3d Cir. 1995), it is a general rule that federal appellate 
courts do not consider an issue not passed upon below.  Singleton, 
428 U.S. at 120. 
     In the instant case, we think it appropriate to remand this 
issue for consideration in the first instance by the district 
court.  Certainly this is not a situation where the proper 
resolution is clear.  Rather, the case law of this circuit and the 
Supreme Court provides very little guidance as to what constitutes 
this "certain quality" of property interest worthy of protection 
under the substantive due process clause.  We have held that 
"ownership is a property interest worthy of substantive due process 
protection," id., but we have found that neither interest in prompt 
receipt of payment for professional services provided to the state, 
Reich, 883 F.2d at 244-45, nor state law entitlement to water and 
sewer services, Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398, 411-12 (3d Cir. 
1988) are the "certain quality" of property interest worthy of 
substantive due process protection.  We also have strongly 
suggested in dictum that a student's right to continued enrollment 
in a graduate program does not rise to such a level on the ground 
that such an interest bears "'little resemblance to the fundamental 
interests that previously had been viewed as implicitly protected 
by the Constitution.'"  Mauriello v. U. of Med. & Dentistry of 
N.J., 781 F.2d 46, 40 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Regents of University 
of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229-30 (Powell, J., 
concurring).   None of the property interests formerly considered 
are especially analogous to the property interest in state-created 
employment.  Given the complexity of this issue, we think it 
appropriate to allow the district court the first opportunity to 
consider it.  Should this issue return to us on appeal, we will 
benefit from the district court's analysis.  Furthermore, we have 
already determined to remand this matter on the procedural due 
process ground as well, eliminating any concern about the injustice 
of delaying the final conclusion of this case.  Accordingly, we 
remand this question to the district court for consideration there. 
                                V. 
     Additionally, Homar contends that a genuine issue of material 
fact exists as to whether Homar's due process rights were violated 
because defendants made public statements about his suspension that 
stigmatized Homar and damaged his reputation.  Specifically, Homar 
alleges that ESU violated his protected liberty interest in two 
ways.  First, he alleges that ESU seriously damaged his good name 
and reputation by publicly disclosing the charges against him.  
Second, Homar alleges that ESU imposed a stigma or disability on 
him, foreclosing his freedom to take advantage of other employment 
opportunities.  We will address these two claims in turn. 
                                A. 
     The Supreme Court has held that a person has a liberty 
interest in employment actions which require due process "where a 
person's good name, reputation, honor or integrity is at stake 
because of what the government is doing to him."  Roth, 408 U.S. at 
573.  Homar claims that this liberty interest was implicated in the 
instant case because ESU's demotion of him "'damage[d] his standing 
and associations in the community.'"  Appellant's Brief at 28 
(citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 573).  Homar may only prevail on this 
claim if he can demonstrate that the government "create[d] and 
disseminate[d] a false and defamatory impression about [him] in 
connection with his termination."  Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 
628 (1977) (per curiam).  See also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 
348-39 (1976). 
     Homar contends that ESU's disclosure of its investigation into 
his activities in a small article that appeared in the Pocono 
Record newspaper, coupled with his subsequent demotion, implicated 
his liberty interest.  We disagree.  The article in the newspaper 
did not disclose any specifics regarding the nature of ESU's 
concern, nor did it disclose information about the disciplinary 
action ESU contemplated.  Furthermore, the article appeared prior 
to his demotion, and there is no evidence to indicate that ESU 
publicly disclosed the outcome of its investigation or the fact 
that it demoted Homar to groundskeeper.  We accordingly find that 
Homar has no liberty interest claim.  See Tucker, 868 F.2d at 82 
(holding that no liberty interest was implicated when press release 
about discharge of police officers was not misleading). 
                                B. 
        Homar further alleges that ESU violated his liberty 
interest because it imposed "a stigma . . . that foreclosed his 
freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities."  
Roth, 408 U.S. at 573.  Yet Homar has proffered no evidence to 
suggest that the disciplinary actions taken by the university had 
in any way foreclosed other employment opportunities.  Indeed, 
Homar testified at his deposition that he had not sought out a 
position with any other employer since his demotion.  App. at 50.  
Furthermore, as noted above, Homar makes no allegations that any 
information in the newspaper article was untrue; the university 
never even publicly disclosed that Homar was terminated from his 
job as police officer.  Under such circumstances, we cannot find 
that Homar's liberty interest was implicated.  Tucker, 868 F.2d at 
83. 
     Accordingly, we affirm the district court's issuance of 
summary judgment as to this issue.   
                               VI. 
     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part 
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
Homar v. Gilbert 
No. 95-7218. 
ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
     I write separately for two reasons.  First, I would hold, 
based on the undisputed facts of this case, that the university's 
suspension of Homar without pay and without a hearing did not 
violate the principles of procedural due process as interpreted by 
the Supreme Court.  I thus dissent from section III.A of the 
majority's opinion.  Second, although I do not disagree with the 
majority's decision to remand the substantive due process question 
to the district court, I wish to set forth my own views on that 
issue. 
 
                                I. 
     A.  Due process does not always require a pre-suspension 
hearing.  See, e.g., FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240-41 (1988); 
Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 63-66 (1979).  In Mallen, the Supreme 
Court observed that "[a]n important government interest, 
accompanied by a substantial assurance that the deprivation is not 
baseless or unwarranted, may in limited cases demanding prompt 
action justify postponing the opportunity to be heard until after 
the initial deprivation."  Id. at 240 (citations omitted); see alsoLogan 
v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) ("[T]he timing 
and nature of the required hearing `will depend on appropriate 
accommodation of the competing interests involved.  These include 
the importance of the private interest and the length or finality 
of the deprivation, the likelihood of governmental error, and the 
magnitude of the governmental interests involved.") (citations and 
footnote omitted).  In my view, this exception should apply here.  
See, e.g., Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 1555, 1562 (10th 
Cir. 1992), aff'd as modified on other ground, 995 F.2d 992 (10th 
Cir. 1993) (en banc). 
     Under the particular circumstances of this case, a pre- 
suspension hearing was not, in my view, essential.  Within a few 
hours of the August 26, 1992, drug raid that resulted in Homar's 
arrest, the university learned that Homar had been charged with 
possession of marijuana, possession with intent to deliver 
marijuana, and criminal conspiracy.  Homar did not report to work 
on August 26 for his 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 p.m. shift.  The next day, 
Homar called his police chief to say that he had been arrested and 
to ask whether he was suspended.  Homar was informed that he was 
suspended, and this was confirmed by letter delivered the same 
day. 
     I do not think that the university violated Homar's right to 
procedural due process when it suspended him from his position as 
a campus police officer after learning that he had been arrested 
and charged with drug violations.  There was probable cause to 
support the criminal charges and hence a substantial assurance that 
the deprivation was not baseless or unwarranted.  The university 
was certainly entitled to take the position that Homar could not be 
permitted to work as a campus police officer with such charges 
outstanding, and there was thus, as the majority concedes, a 
compelling government interest present.  And the university needed 
to act promptly.  The majority admits all of this but finds that 
the university had to suspend Homar with pay.  I find no 
requirement that in such circumstances a public employer must pay 
its suspended employees. 
     B.  In reaching its conclusion to the contrary, the majority 
declares that "a governmental employer may not suspend an employee 
without pay unless that suspension is preceded by some kind of pre- 
suspension hearing."  Majority Opinion, Typescript at 14.  The 
majority essentially announces a blanket rule that a public 
employer that wishes to suspend an employee -- even an employee in 
a public-safety position who has been charged with multiple 
felonies -- must either provide a pre-suspension hearing or suspend 
the employee with pay.  This holding is based on one sentence of 
dictum from Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 
544-45 (1985), the Eleventh Circuit's reliance on that dictum in 
Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1512 (11th Cir. 1987), and this 
court's opinion in Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 
1064 (3d Cir. 1990).  These bases do not, in my view, withstand 
scrutiny. 
     With regard to Loudermill, I note that the Supreme Court there 
expressly recognized that "[t]here are, of course, some situations 
in which a postdeprivation hearing will satisfy due process 
requirements."  Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542 n.7 (citations 
omitted).  It is of course true, as the Court later notes, that an 
employer can avoid any due process problems associated with keeping 
a dangerous employee on the job by suspending the employee with 
pay, id. at 544-45, "for then there is not a deprivation."  Bailey 
v. Board of County Commissioners of Alachua County, 956 F.2d 1112, 
1124 n.13 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992).  But as 
the Federal Circuit has explained, this "is merely descriptive, not 
normative.  We agree that in the instant case, the government could 
have suspended with pay.  Nevertheless, we cannot read Loudermillas 
holding that the government must suspend him with pay."  Engdahl 
v. Department of Navy, 900 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  I 
agree. 
     The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Everett, which was issued 
before the Supreme Court's decision in Mallen, simply relies on the 
Loudermill dictum.  Numerous courts of appeals have reached a 
contrary conclusion regarding the import of Loudermill, 
particularly after Mallen.  See Jones v. City of Gary, 57 F.3d 
1435, 1441-45 (7th Cir. 1995) (no pre-suspension hearing required 
where firefighter was suspended without pay; plaintiff's property 
interests were adequately protected by post-deprivation hearing); 
id. at 1445-46 (Ripple, J., concurring) ("there are circumstances 
in which the need for swift action on the part of those who 
exercise governmental authority and responsibility for the safety 
and security of others can justify the elimination or truncation of 
even the bare-bones pretermination hearing required by Loudermill") 
(citations omitted); Chaney v. Suburban Bus Div. of the Regional 
Transp. Auth., 52 F.3d 623, 628 (7th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff bus 
driver suspended without pay after bus hit and injured pedestrian; 
no pre-suspension hearing necessary as employer's interests 
"clearly outweigh[ed]" those of plaintiff); Ambus v. Granite Bd. of 
Educ., 975 F.2d 1555, 1562 (10th Cir. 1992) (court discussed 
Loudermill but applied the Mallen exception where a teacher was 
suspended without pay and without a hearing after the school 
learned that the teacher had been arrested on drug charges; court 
stated that "the substantiated knowledge that a teacher had been 
arrested for drug sales raised a substantial government interest 
justifying immediate suspension without pay"), aff'd as modified onother 
ground, 995 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1993) (en banc); Strong v. 
Board of Educ. of Uniondale Union Free School Dist., 902 F.2d 208, 
212 (2d Cir.) (citing Loudermill and Mallen, court concluded that, 
on balance, no pre-termination hearing required; court stressed 
that probable value of hearing was not very great because parties 
were well aware of each other's assertions), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
897 (1990); see also Richardson v. U.S. Customs Service, 47 F.3d 
415, 418-19 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (discussing 5 U.S.C.  7513(b)(1)) 
("[A]n indictment for a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment 
may be imposed will, as a general rule, provide reasonable cause 
for an agency to believe that the employee has committed such a 
crime, and, when the nature of the crime alleged relates to the 
employee's ability to perform his or her duties, an agency may 
summarily suspend the employee, without pay, pending the outcome of 
the criminal proceedings.") (citations omitted); Bailey v. Board of 
County Commissioners of Alachua County, 956 F.2d 1112, 1123-24 & 
n.13 (11th Cir.) (qualified immunity) (stressing flexibility of 
standard regarding necessity of pre-deprivation hearing where 
prison guard was suspended without pay upon his arrest), cert.denied, 506 
U.S. 832 (1992); Gamble v. Webb, 806 F.2d 1258, 1261 
(5th Cir. 1986) (relying upon Loudermill's statement that "`there 
are, of course, some situations in which a post-deprivation hearing 
will satisfy due process,'" and concluding, under Logan balancing 
test, that "the present one is such a situation") (quoting 
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542 n.7) (brackets omitted).  All of these 
decisions -- like the Supreme Court's procedural due process cases 
in general and unlike the majority's blanket rule -- reflect a 
balancing of interests based on the particular circumstances of 
each case. 
     I also believe that the majority has misinterpreted our 
opinion in Bradley.  Citing Bradley, 913 F.2d at 1077, the majority 
states that Bradley implies that suspension without pay and without 
a pre-suspension hearing always violates due process.  Majority 
Opinion, Typescript at 13-14.  However, on the next page of the 
Bradley opinion, the panel clearly stated: 
     We need not decide in this case whether Bradley was 
     entitled to a pre-suspension hearing, as he contends, or 
     whether a post-suspension hearing sufficed.  CompareLoudermill, 470 
U.S. at 544, 105 S.Ct. at 1494 (because 
     government's interest in immediate termination of 
     security guard who had lied when seeking employment did 
     not outweigh employee's interest in retaining employment, 
     pre-termination hearing was required) with FDIC v. 
     Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 108 S.Ct.1780, 1787-88, 100 L.Ed.2d 
     265 (1988) (because government had substantial interest 
     in suspending indicted bank official to protect bank and 
     depositors, a post-suspension hearing within a reasonable 
     time was sufficient). 
           
          Bradley received no hearing, either before or after 
     the suspension, and hence if he was suspended, as the 
     record suggests, he was deprived of due process. 
913 F.2d at 1078.  In my view, far from implying anything, the 
Bradley panel expressly reserved decision on the issue presented in 
this case. 
     I would resolve that issue in this case by following the great 
weight of federal appellate authority cited above and holding that 
whether a pre-suspension hearing was required in this particular 
case requires a balancing of the relevant factors.  For the reasons 
already expressed above, I would hold that in the circumstances of 
this case, a pre-suspension hearing was not required and that a 
post-suspension hearing within a reasonable time after the 
suspension was sufficient.  It may be that the university failed to 
conduct a sufficiently prompt or adequate post-suspension hearing 
after the criminal charges were dismissed on September 1, 1992, but 
that is a different question.  Moreover, as in Strong, I am not 
sure how a pre-suspension hearing on August 26, 1992, would have 
made any difference.  The only fact important to the university's 
decision was whether Homar had been arrested and charged.  Homar 
did not dispute this, and in fact confirmed it the next day; Homar 
was well aware of the reasons for his suspension.  As in Strong, 
the hearing required by the majority would have been "an empty 
formality."  See Strong, 902 F.2d at 212. 
     C.  I have one final problem with the section of the majority 
opinion dealing with the need for a pre-suspension hearing.  The 
majority assumes that an important government interest requiring 
prompt action is what permits an employer to suspend an employee 
without a pre-suspension hearing but with pay.  I think that this 
is inaccurate.  It is my understanding that a public employer may 
generally suspend a public employee for cause, with pay, and 
without a hearing -- even absent an emergency situation -- because 
such a suspension does not ordinarily implicate any 
constitutionally protected property interest.  See, e.g., Hicks v. 
City of Watonga, 942 F.2d 737, 746 n.4 (10th Cir. 1991) ("[N]o 
property interest was infringed at Mr. Hicks' first round of 
hearings when he was suspended and then reprimanded.  Mr. Hicks 
suffered no loss in pay because of the pre-hearing suspension.  
Suspension with pay does not raise due process concerns.") 
(citations omitted); Pitts v. Board of Educ. of U.S.D. 305, Salina, 
Kansas, 869 F.2d 555, 556 (10th Cir. 1989) (same); see alsoHardiman v. 
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 709 F.2d 635, 637-38 & 
n.2 (11th Cir. 1983) (not deciding but questioning whether 
suspension with pay could ever constitute deprivation of property 
interest, and opining that "bad-faith" suspension with pay might 
infringe liberty interest); Koelsch v. Town of Amesbury, 851 F. 
Supp. 497, 500 (D. Mass. 1994) ("A public employee's suspension 
with pay does not implicate a constitutionally protected property 
interest.") (citations omitted).  Under the majority's reasoning, 
the important government interest requiring prompt action is 
rendered a nullity because it simply allows the employer to do what 
it could do in a typical non-emergency, for-cause suspension 
situation, i.e., suspend the employee with pay. 
 
                               II. 
     Although I do not disagree with the majority's determination 
that a remand is in order on Homar's substantive due process claim, 
I write separately to set forth my views on the viability of that 
claim.  I do not think that a plaintiff has a substantive due 
process claim for a non-legislative deprivation of a state-created 
property right by a public employer.  Moreover, if Homar has a 
substantive due process claim in this context, it seems to me that 
he must show that the employer's actions were not rationally 
related to a legitimate government interest; mere allegations of 
bad faith cannot suffice. 
     A.  Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has previously 
held that a plaintiff has a substantive due process claim for a 
non-legislative deprivation of a state-created property interest by 
a public employer.  The Eleventh Circuit recently overruled a 
decade of its own decisions recognizing such claims.  McKinney v. 
Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 898 (1995); see also Rivkin v. Dover Twp. Rent Leveling Bd., 
671 A.2d 567 (N.J. 1996).  Essentially for the reasons stated in 
McKinney, which I find persuasive, I believe that Homar's 
allegations state only procedural due process claims. 
     In McKinney, the Eleventh Circuit considered the following 
issue:  "whether, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a government 
employee possessing a state-created property interest in his 
employment states a substantive due process claim, rather than a 
procedural due process claim, when he alleges that he was deprived 
of the employment interest by an arbitrary and capricious non- 
legislative government action."  Id. at 1553.  Sitting en banc, a 
unanimous Eleventh Circuit answered "no," and in an effort to bring 
its cases back into line with Supreme Court precedent, overruled a 
decade of its prior decisions.  The court held that "in non- 
legislative cases, only procedural due process claims are available 
to pretextually terminated employees."  Id. at 1560; see alsoRivkin, 671 
A.2d at 577 (plaintiffs' purported substantive due 
process claim "is much closer to a procedural due process claim" in 
that it "amounts to an allegation that the State failed to furnish 
an impartial tribunal, which `is a matter of procedural, not 
substantive, due process'") (citations omitted). 
     Two aspects of the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in McKinney bear 
emphasis here.  First, the court concluded that allegations of 
arbitrary and capricious action by governmental employers affecting 
an individual's property interest in public employment "will not 
make out a substantive due process claim under the jurisprudence of 
the Supreme Court . . . because only procedural issues are 
implicated."  Id. at 1559 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 
1561 ("McKinney's allegation is procedural:  the County failed to 
provide one of the elements of procedural due process -- an 
unbiased decisionmaker.").  I agree, as I discuss further below. 
     Second, crucial to the court's decision was the distinction 
between legislative acts and non-legislative or executive acts.  
Executive acts, such as employment decisions, typically apply to 
one person or to a limited number of persons, while legislative 
acts, generally laws and broad executive regulations, apply to 
large segments of society.  Id. at 1557 n.9.  The court criticized 
its prior decision in Hearn v. City of Gainesville, 688 F.2d 1328 
(11th Cir. 1982) -- its first case to apply substantive due process 
analysis to an arbitrary termination claim --  because "[i]n that 
case, where a terminated employee challenged an executive act, we 
cited Nebbia [v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)], where a 
legislative act (to wit, a law) was at issue."  Id. at 1558 n.14.  
The court added that "[i]t is imperative that a stricter 
segregation of these two distinct case-categories be maintained."  
Id.  The court indicated that rational basis review under the 
substantive component of the Due Process Clause is appropriate only 
in the context of challenges to legislative action.  Id. at 1557-58 
& nn. 9 & 14; see also TRM, Inc. v. United States, 52 F.3d 941, 945 
& n.17 (11th Cir. 1995) (applying rational basis review to 
substantive due process challenge to regulation under Food Stamp 
Act and noting that "[t]his standard is not affected by our 
decision in McKinney" because "[t]he holding of that case was 
specifically limited to substantive due process challenges to non- 
legislative acts") (citations omitted); Sullivan Properties, Inc. 
v. City of Winter Springs, 899 F. Supp. 587, 594-96 (M.D. Fla. 
1995) (considering the impact of McKinney on substantive due 
process challenges in the area of zoning and the granting of 
building permits; concluding that there is a "substantive due 
process cause of action for arbitrary and unreasonable zoning 
ordinances" but not for "substantive due process claims 
[challenging] executive acts granting or denying a particular 
building permit application").  I again agree. 
     Like the prior decisions in the Eleventh Circuit, a decision 
allowing Homar to maintain a substantive due process claim based on 
an allegation of bad faith would elevate Homar's procedural 
challenges to substantive due process status.  Assuming that there 
is a factual issue regarding whether defendants acted in bad faith, 
I question the wisdom of recognizing a substantive due process 
claim where a university fails to provide adequate procedural due 
process and where the way in which procedural due process is denied 
could give rise to an inference of bad faith.  This sort of 
"substantive procedural due process claim" is precisely what 
troubled both the Eleventh Circuit in McKinney and a unanimous New 
Jersey Supreme Court in Rivkin, and I would not recognize such a 
claim.  It seems to me that Homar's claim is clearly procedural and 
should be recognized as such. 
     Further, the cases upon which Homar relies essentially derive 
-- as is discussed more fully below -- from Pace Resources, Inc. v. 
Shrewsbury Tp., 808 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 
(1987), and Rogin v. Bensalem Tp., 616 F.2d 680, 689 (3d Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981), both of which involve 
challenges to zoning ordinances and thus challenges to legislative 
acts.  The cases that have applied Pace Resources and Rogin in 
challenges to non-legislative acts have, in my view, fallen into 
the trap identified by the Eleventh Circuit in McKinney.  I would 
not extend them into the public employment setting. 
     B.  Assuming for the sake of argument that there is a 
substantive due process claim for arbitrary and capricious non- 
legislative actions by public employers and that Homar's interest 
in his position as a campus police officer constituted a "property" 
interest for substantive due process purposes, I nonetheless 
conclude that Homar seeks application of the wrong standard in 
evaluating his claim.  Under true rational basis review -- which is 
the most that Homar is entitled to where he is asserting the 
violation of a non-fundamental, state-created property interest -- 
I think that Homar failed to create a fact issue as to whether the 
university violated his substantive due process rights. 
     The appropriateness of summary judgment as to Homar's 
substantive due process claim requires consideration of what Homar 
must show to establish a substantive due process violation.  Homar 
argues that our cases hold that a plaintiff can establish a 
substantive due process violation by proving that the government's 
actions were motivated by bias, bad faith, or improper motive.  
Homar contends that a public employee who suffers an adverse 
employment decision may maintain a substantive due process claim 
against the public employer by showing (1) that the employer's 
actions were not rationally related to a legitimate government 
interest or (2) that the employer's actions were motivated by (a) 
bias, (b) bad faith, or (c) improper motive.  I do not agree. 
     First, as I alluded to above, we have never applied this test 
in the public employment context, and I would not extend this test 
to this context, whatever its appropriateness in other contexts.  
Further, it seems to me that the statements in our opinions 
regarding the nature of rational basis review in substantive due 
process cases have evolved in a strange and, I think, unintended 
way.  Beginning with unobjectionable descriptions of classical 
rational basis review, our opinions eventually reached the point of 
suggesting that a plaintiff can state a substantive due process 
claim merely by alleging that an individual decision resulting in 
the deprivation of a property right was taken in bad faith.  The 
Supreme Court has never sanctioned such a broad proposition, and I 
am confident that this cannot be the law.  If a plaintiff like 
Homar has a substantive due process claim in this context, it seems 
to me that he must show that the employer's actions were not 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest and that 
mere allegations of bad faith cannot suffice. 
     In Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Tp., 808 F.2d 1023 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987), plaintiff challenged a 
municipality's land use restrictions on substantive due process 
grounds.  In describing the "narrow review" over zoning ordinances, 
we quoted our prior decision in Rogin v. Bensalem Tp., 616 F.2d 
680, 689 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981): 
     "The test for determining whether a law comports with 
     substantive due process is whether the law is rationally 
     related to a legitimate state interest.  `[T]he law need 
     not be in every respect logically consistent with its 
     aims to be constitutional.  It is enough that there is an 
     evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought 
     that the particular legislative measure was a rational 
     way to correct it.'" 
808 F.2d at 1034 (quoting Rogin, 616 F.2d at 689) (quoting 
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)) (brackets 
in Rogin).  We explained that "[a] plaintiff making a substantive 
due process claim in federal court has the burden of showing that 
the regulation is arbitrary or irrational.  Thus to state a claim, 
Pace's complaint would have to allege facts that would support a 
finding of arbitrary or irrational legislative action by the 
Township."  Id. at 1035 (citations omitted).  After concluding that 
"Pace's complaint fails to make any factual allegations that 
indicate irrationality" and that "Pace does not present a case 
involving actions aimed at this developer for reasons unrelated to 
land use planning," we concluded that "[b]ecause it appears on the 
face of the amended complaint that the Township decisionmakers 
could have had rational reasons for the decisions contested here 
and because that complaint alleges no facts suggesting 
arbitrariness, it fails to state a substantive due process claim 
upon which relief can be granted."  Id. at 1035-36 (citation 
omitted). 
     In Bello v. Walker, we noted the rational basis review 
articulated in Pace Resources, but we focused on the language from 
Pace stating that the plaintiff there did not allege "actions aimed 
at this developer for reasons unrelated to land use planning."  
Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129 (3d Cir.) (citation omitted), 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 851 (1988).  We thus distinguished Pace 
Resources and announced as follows: 
          We need not define, at this juncture, the outer 
     limits of the showing necessary to demonstrate that a 
     governmental action was arbitrary, irrational, or tainted 
     by improper motive.  The plaintiffs in this case 
     presented evidence from which a fact finder could 
     reasonably conclude that certain council members, acting 
     in their capacity as officers of the municipality 
     improperly interfered with the process by which the 
     municipality issued building permits, and that they did 
     so for partisan political or personal reasons unrelated 
     to the merits of the application for the permits.  These 
     actions can have no relationship to any legitimate 
     governmental objective, and if proven, are sufficient to 
     establish a substantive due process violation actionable 
     under section 1983. 
Id. at 1129-30 (footnote omitted). 
     Next, the panel in Midnight Sessions paraphrased Bello and 
stated that "a plaintiff may maintain a claim of substantive due 
process violation upon allegations that the government deliberately 
and arbitrarily abused its power."  Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City 
of Phil., 945 F.2d 667, 683 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted), 
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 984 (1992).  "Thus, allegations that the 
government's actions in a particular case were motivated by bias, 
bad faith, or improper motive . . . may support a finding of 
substantive due process violation."  Id. (citing Bello and Pace 
Resources). 
     In Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Phil., 5 F.3d 685, 692 (3d 
Cir. 1993), we explained that "[s]ubstantive due process protects 
citizens from arbitrary and irrational acts of government."  Id. at 
692 (citing Rogin v. Bensalem Tp., 616 F.2d 680, 689 (3d Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981)).  We then stated the 
following test (which is the test quoted by the parties in this 
case):  "A violation of substantive due process rights is proven:  
(1) if the government's actions were not rationally related to a 
legitimate interest; or (2) `if the government's actions in a 
particular case were in fact motivated by bias, bad faith or 
improper motive.'"  Id. (citation omitted); see also Blanche Road 
Corp. v. Bensalem Tp., 57 F.3d 253, 263 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
116 S. Ct. 303 (1995). 
     From Rogin to Parkway Garage, then, we have moved from 
inquiring merely whether a legislative act survived pure rational 
basis review to inquiring whether actions by specific defendants 
vis-a-vis a specific plaintiff were somehow improper.  It seems to 
me that our cases began looking to governmental conduct that might 
prove a lack of rational basis, but we have now set forth an 
entirely separate test for evaluating substantive due process 
claims that is independent of standard rational basis review.  Seealso 
Rivkin, 671 A.2d at 576-77 (declining to follow DeBlasio and 
Bello and stating that "[i]t is a mistake . . . to equate the 
concept of `arbitrary and irrational' governmental land use 
decisions with the substantive component of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment").  In my view, the court should take 
the next available opportunity to clarify that the appropriate test 
is true rational basis review. 
     If we are to recognize substantive due process claims in the 
public employment context -- which, for the reasons discussed 
above, I think would be a mistake -- then, in my view, we should 
ask merely whether the plaintiff can show that the employer's 
actions were not rationally related to a legitimate government 
interest.  It should not be enough to allege bad faith by a single 
governmental actor; the overall conduct complained of must be 
unrelated to any legitimate governmental interest.  If this mode of 
analysis is applied to this case, I think that it is clear that the 
university's actions were rationally related to its legitimate 
interests, and, indeed, Homar does not contend otherwise. 
     C.  In sum, substantive due process applies where there is a 
fundamental right at stake or legislation is challenged as having 
no rational relationship to any legitimate government interest.  
Here, plaintiff suggests no fundamental right within the meaning of 
the substantive component of the Due Process Clause; nor is 
plaintiff challenging a legislative act on rational-basis grounds.  
In my view, then, plaintiff has no substantive due process claim on 
the undisputed facts presented. 
 
                               III. 
     For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the 
majority's conclusion, set forth in section III.A, that Homar had 
a right to a hearing prior to his suspension.  Although I join in 
section IV of the opinion remanding the substantive due process 
issue to the district court, I do not believe that Homar's 
substantive due process claim should survive a motion for summary 
judgment on remand. 
 
